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Severance Taxes as an Offensive




Recently, the contours of the coal market's reaction to the
1990 Clean Air Act have begun to form. Commentators knowl-
edgeable of coal, utilities, rail service and law have been carefully
watching and noting how the experiment of using a free market
concept to control environmental quality will affect coal and rail
suppliers. The United States Supreme Court issued an opinion in
1992 that may change the balance of competition in favor of coal-
producing states. In Wyoming v. Oklahoma,1 the Supreme Court
held that Wyoming had standing to challenge an Oklahoma law
creating a preference for Oklahoma coal among Oklahoma gener-
ating plants. In a six to three opinion, the Supreme Court ruled
that Wyoming had standing to sue based on lost severance tax
revenue.
2
This ruling may threaten to derail the clear intent of Con-
gress not to create an environmental policy that will destroy sub-
stantial segments of the coal market by over-encouraging reliance
on western low-sulfur producers who have the best opportunity to
monopolize the market while utilities prepare to meet 1995 stan-
dards of the Clean Air Act.' There is little nonproducing states
can affirmatively do to stop the effect of this ruling, and the lack
of a weapon for states to challenge another state's severance tax
will make nonproducing states even more vulnerable.
* Associate, Barret, Haynes, May, Carter & Roark, P.S.C., Hazard, Ky.; J.D., 1992,
University of Kentucky; Institute of Mines and Minerals Research Fellow; B.A., 1989,
University of Kentucky.
112 S.Ct. 789 (1992).
2 Id. at 804.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7651(c), (f) (1989).
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I. THE CLEAN AIR ACT
The 1990 Clean Air Act (the Act) represents a hybrid of the
ideologies of the two generations that produced it. It contains an
aggressive stance toward environmental quality that many of the
1960s and 1970s generation hoped would be possible and repre-
sents forceful legislation that large polluters could not afford to
ignore.4 Yet the Act also embodies the free-market principles so
popular during the 1980s, encouraging a market-driven approach
to controlling pollution from power plants and automobile emis-
sions.5 The Bush Administration, in general, and EPA administra-
tor William K. Reilly, in particular, pushed Congress to adopt in-
centive strategies rather than the command and control methods
used in the 1970s environmental laws.
The package that became law included a tradeable-permit in-
centive system patterned after the one suggested by the Bush Ad-
ministration.6 The law also included a market-based system for
reducing sulfur dioxide emissions by 10 million tons for a total
reduction to 8.9 million tons by the year 2000.' In November
1990, President Bush signed a compromise between the House
and Senate bills which called for a market-based approach to re-
ducing sulfur dioxide emissions by 10 million tons.8 The effect of
the new law will be to create a two-phase reduction in sulfur-diox-
ide emissions, capped after the year 2000. Phase I, to be com-
pleted by 1995, will require 110 coal-burning utility power plants
I See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399
(1990); see also H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), reprinted in, 135 CONG. REC.
H4448-52 (daily ed. July 27, 1989)(drafted by the Bush Administration); S. 1490, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), reprinted in, 135 CONG. REC. S9936-01 (1989). The 101st Con-
gress, in addition, demonstrated a general enthusiasm for economic incentives to solve a
variety of environmental problems.
I Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, §§ 218 (mobile emis-
sions sources), 401 (permits), 501 (acid rain) 104 Stat. 2399 (1990).
6 S. 1490, 101st. Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), reprinted in. 135 CONG. REC. S9936-01
(1989). The Senate's version had a tradeable-permit system similar to the one in Bush's
proposal. The House passed a substantially similar piece of legislation in May.
42 U.S.C. § 7651(a)(1), (3) (1989).
See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, §§ 401-413, 104
Stat. 2399, 2584-2634 (1990) (providing new measures for reducing acid rain and contain-
ing several provisions allowing for meeting production requirements for reformulated and
oxygenated fuels in selected non attainment areas where ozone and carbon monoxide
problems exist); Clean Air Act Amendment § 219 (amending Clean Air Act § 211, 42
U.S.C. § 7545 (1988))(adding subsection (k) directing the EPA Administrator to promul-




to reduce sulfur emissions below 2.5 lbs/mmB.t.u.9 Phase II will
require smaller power plants to come into compliance for sulfur
emissions and will require most power plants to install scrubbers.' 0
The incentive system includes permits which represent one
ton of sulfur dioxide per year and can be bought, sold, or traded.11
Plants which exceed EPA requirements will have to pay for per-
mits or credits, while those who economize by reducing sulfur di-
oxide emissions can earn a bonus by selling their credits to others.
II. INDUSTRY REACTIONS TO THE ACT
Much of the responsibility for reducing sulfur-dioxide emis-
sions will fall to coal-fired power plants. Because the new Act
gives the plants an array of alternatives for reducing or paying for
sulfur-dioxide emissions, there has been industry-wide speculation
as to the ultimate outcome of the Act on various segments of the
coal, rail and utility industries. Power plants seem to have various
options, including fuel conversion and blending, flue gas scrubbers
and "clean coal technologies" as they become commercially avail-
able.12 However Congress' intention is clearly to encourage utili-
ties to install scrubbing devices and continue buying local, high-
sulfur coal. For example, utilities installing qualifying Phase I
technology, including scrubbers, can receive a two-year delay in
compliance. Phase I plants can use emission control technologies
to reduce sulfur emissions to less than 1.2 pounds per million
B.t.u.'s and can receive two-for-one bonus allowances.
13
Many utilities, however, will decide that retrofitting their
power plants with scrubbers, while more economical in the long
run, is too expensive in the short run. "The dilemma facing utili-
ties today in terms of their costs for coal energy is the classic 'pay
me now or pay me later' syndrome. Specifically, as companies
search for low-cost coal today, they cannot ignore Clean Air Act
provisions that will demand strict environmental compliance in
1995 and in 2000, compliance that carries some heavy price
42 U.S.C. § 7651(c), (f).
* Robert J. Nordstrom & Robert 1. Tanours, Coal Supply Contracts and the Pro-
posed 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, 12 E. MIN. L. FOUND. § 12.01(2) (1991).
" 42 U.S.C. § 7651(a).
" Richard G. Sharp, The Clean Air Act Amendments: Impacts on Rail Coal Trans-
portation, 127 PUB. UTIL. FORT. No. 5, at 26 (March 1, 1991).
" 42 U.S.C. § 7651(c).
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tags.'"" Higher costs of western U.S. coal include not only lower
heating content but also higher transportation costs for power
plants in the eastern part of the nation:"
In the long run, the decision to scrub high-sulfur coal rather
than switch to western coal makes solid, financial sense. As stip-
ulated in the Clean Air Act Amendments, scrubbing will gener-
ate allowance for utilities that can be banked, traded, or leased
to reduce the cost of emission controls. Also, the transportation
costs associated with shipping western coal over long distances
will not be cost effective once there is a captive market.' 6
Another disadvantage of relying on western coal is that once
Phase II of the Act is implemented, utilities will be required to
control nitrogen oxide emissions as well as sulfur-dioxide.1 The
nitrogen oxide problem would not be solved simply by buying
western coal. 8 Despite these disadvantages, many utilities will opt
for the short-term solution of purchasing western U.S. coal. 19
III. IMPACT OF SEVERANCE TAXES
Since the Arab oil embargo of the 1970s caused the federal
government to encourage states to increase energy production, en-
ergy-producing states have implemented a number of taxing
schemes.2 Ostensibly, the purpose of these taxing schemes is to
ensure that the states can correct environmental damage done by
1 Kim Underwood, Energy: The Cost of Deferment, 129 PUB. UTIL. FORT. No. 8, at
15 (April 15, 1992).
1 Id. The dynamics of the effect of the Act on rail rates are still in a shake-out phase.
One writer contends that utilities relying on western coal will pay higher rates because of
longer hauls, but the unit rail revenues should not rise significantly. What utilities can
expect is less efficient coal traffic due to smaller average traffic volumes. However, this
effect should be minimized because most utilities who are meeting emissions requirements
by burning lower sulfur coal will probably be blending western coal with coal from existing
suppliers. This process should soften the effect of higher transportation costs and reduced
efficiency. See Sharp, supra note 12.
10 Underwood, supra, note 14.
1 42 U.S.C. § 8.02, repealed by 42 U.S.C. § 7651(0.
" Underwood, supra note 14.
19 Id.
2 States can: (l)derive taxes from the mining and exploitation of resources; (2)collect
rents or royalties from the enterprise that extracts the energy source; and (3)produce and
market the energy resources themselves. States can also receive royalties from minerals
mined on federally-owned lands within their boundaries. The minimum federal royalty is
12.5% of the amount or value of the mineral removed. 30 U.S.C. § 226(c)(1976). Fifty
percent of federal royalties are allocated to the states. In fiscal year 1978, states received
$228 million in royalties from energy produced on federally-owned land. Nancy E. Shurtz.
SEVERANCE TAXES
extensive mining or encourage diversification in the event that the
natural resource is exhausted." In reality, however, severance
taxes have no specific purpose. The taxes only generally "defer the
overall social, environmental, and economic costs associated with
producing that natural resource." 2 Most often the tax burden
falls on out-of-state residents to whom the natural resource is
shipped.2"
There are five ways a state can constitutionally challenge an-
other state's tax structure. Challenges may be based on the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause, the Supremacy Clause, the Due
Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause and the Commerce
Clause.
A. The Privileges and Immunities Clause
The United States Constitution provides that "[tihe Citizens
of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens in the several States."2 4 The premise of the clause is that
a person from one state should be able to enter into another state
and enjoy basic fundamental rights such as purchasing property,
engaging in trade and gaining access to the courts.2" Stated sim-
ply, the clause "was designed to insure to a citizen of State A who
ventures into State B the same privileges which the citizens of
State B enjoy."2 6
In the taxation setting, the United States Supreme Court
struck down a vendors' license tax on nonresidents selling out-of-
state goods in the taxing state.2 7 The State had imposed a higher
levy on non-resident vendors than comparable resident vendors,
offending the Privileges and Immunities Clause.2" However, sev-
eral aspects of the Privileges and Immunities Clause make it a
State Taxation of Energy Resources: Are Consuming States Getting Burned?, 36 VAND. L.
REV. 55, 58 n.5 (1983).
21 Specific user taxes, such as highway use taxes, are not revenue measures, but rather
charges or rentals for the use of a public facility. PAUL J. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITA-
TIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION § 2:6, at 31 (1981).
22 Shurtz, supra note 20, at 59.
"' See CHARLES MCCLURE, TAX EXPORTING AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE: REFLEC-
TIONS ON COMMONWEALTH EDISON (1981).
24 U.S CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
" Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1870).
2 Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948) (citing Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg.
Co., 252 U.S. 60, 78 (1920); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180-81 (1868)).
27 Ward, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 432.
22 Id. at 430.
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weak weapon for a state challenging the severance tax of another
state. First, the clause has been interpreted as inapplicable to cor-
porations.29 Second, since corporations are primarily involved in
mineral extraction, they would have no standing to sue, and no
cases have been reported challenging severance taxes on
minerals."0
B. The Supremacy Clause
Article VI, section 2 of the United States Constitution pro-
vides that "[ft]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land.""1 The Supremacy Clause
has been understood to involve two types of laws enacted by Con-
gress: those that might conflict with state laws and laws that are
not in direct conflict with state laws, but in which Congress has
expressed or implied an intent to occupy the field. 2
The primary Supreme Court case involving a Supremacy
Clause challenge to a severance tax found that the tax did not
offend the Supremacy Clause because Congress has exhibited no
intent to occupy the field. In Commonwealth Edison v. Mon-
tana," Commonwealth Edison argued that Montana's coal sever-
ance tax frustrated the federal goal of encouraging use of low-
sulfur coal. The Court denied that such a general national policy
would be sufficient to preempt the severance tax."
2" Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S.(8 Wall.) 168, 177-78 (1869); Bank of Augusta v. Earle,
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586 (1839). The Court has merged nonresidents with noncitizens
within the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Although the clause refers
only to "citizens," the Court has held that "a general taxing scheme ... if it discriminates
against all nonresidents, has the necessary effect of including in the discrimination those
who are citizens of other states." Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 78-79
(1920).
"o Shurtz, supra note 22, at 88 n.220 (noting that severance taxes do not usually dis-
tinguish between residents and nonresidents).
" U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
" See RONALD R_ ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE
AND PROCEDURE § 12.1-.7 (1986).
33 453 U.S. 609 (1981). The Supreme Court relied on the preemption doctrine to
strike down a Louisiana severance tax on natural gas, holding that the Federal Natural
Gas Act was enacted to prevent states from regulating the price of gas. Maryland v. Loui-
siana, 451 U.S. 725, 751. In Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead, New Mexico attempted to
tax the sale of electricity generated within its state, and this tax was also struck down as
violating the Tax Reform Act of 1976. 441 U.S. 141, 150 (1979).
Commonwealth Edison Co., 453 U.S. at 633.
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In her 1983 article on severance taxation, Nancy Shurtz con-
cludes that a clear conflict must exist between a state tax and a
federal statute for the federal law to preempt the state tax. 30
Courts are more likely to strike down a regulatory tax than a rev-
enue-raising tax. In particular, taxes that attempt to regulate the
price of oil, gas, or other natural resources and are the subject of
a federal law are most likely to be overturned. a6
C. The Due Process Clause
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has
been construed to limit a state's ability to reach taxpayers in other
states. The taxing of out-of-state businesses must meet two re-
quirements to pass due process provisions: a sufficient nexus and
fair apportionment. When states have attempted to tax an out-of-
state business with whom the taxing state has had an insubstantial
nexus, the Supreme Court has struck down the tax."7 Even when
the nexus requirement is met, the state must fairly apportion the
tax to the taxpayer's activities in the state.38 While no Supreme
Court cases exist on the relationship between the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and severance taxes, the
Court's dicta in Commonwealth Edison v. Montana said that a
severance tax would be disapproved if it is so arbitrary as to
amount to "confiscation of property."' 9
D. The Equal Protection Clause
Historically the Equal Protection Clause has been a weak
weapon against state taxation schemes, partly due to the minimal
standards for states required by the United States Supreme
Court.40 Equal protection jurisprudence established three levels of
inquiry depending on the rights involved. Classifications based on
race, for example, are judged by the strict scrutiny standard. A
11 Shurtz, supra note 22, at 91.
34 Id.
" See, e.g., Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954). The case held
that Maryland lacked power to compel a Delaware vendor to collect taxes on sales made to
Maryland residents, id. at 347. The footnotes question that assertion, id. at 353-57 n.8-20.
" E.g., Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275, 281-85 (1919).
39 453 U.S. 609, 627 n.17 (1981)(citing Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 44
(1934)).
"0 See State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 537-38 (1931); see also
JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN, I STATE TAXATION, § 3.2, at 42-43 (1983).
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law involving a fundamental right 4 ' would be upheld under this
standard only if the state could show a compelling state interest
and that the statute was necessary to achieve that end."2 Under
mid-level or intermediate scrutiny, classifications are based on
gender, alienage and illegitimacy. The state must show that its
law has "important governmental objectives and is substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives."4 The lowest level
of scrutiny is the rational basis test, which requires only a legiti-
mate purpose supported by a statute that is "rationally related to
the state's objective.""
In Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co.,4 5 the Court rejected an
equal protection argument when the plaintiff complained that a
severance tax on anthracite coal which excluded bituminous coal
violated the rational basis standard for equal protection review.
Noting that the two types of coal had different properties and dif-
ferent uses, the Court upheld the state's distinction as rationally
related to a legitimate state purpose.4 6 However, the Supreme
Court in recent years has added more bite to the equal protection
clause to protect nonresidents of a state from potentially unequal
tax liability:
Although it is unlikely that equal protection claims will supplant
discrimination claims under either the commerce clause or the
privileges and immunities clause, recent case law has breathed
new life into the equal protection clause in the state tax area.
This is especially evident in cases of discrimination against non-
residents. If the Supreme Court continues on its present course
of adding greater 'bite' to its equal protection review of state
laws involving nonresidents, the equal protection clause may
eventually become an equal partner with the two more senior
members of the constitutional triumvirate that limits states' dis-
crimination against nonresidents.7
" Harrah Indep. School Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 199 (1979).
41 JOHN HART ELY. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: FACILITATING THE REPRESENTATION
OF MINORITIES 145-46 (1980).
" Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1124 (1977).
" Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 315 (1976)(footnote
omitted); see also Daniel v. Family Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 224 (1949).
" 260 U.S. 245 (1992).
41 Id. at 261.
41 Matthew J. Finn & Steven Reed, Equal Protection and State Taxation of Inter-
state Business, 41 TAX LAW. 83, 84 (1987)(footnotes omitted).
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E. The Commerce Clause
The most effective potential weapon against a state's sever-
ance tax is the Dormant Commerce Clause. The Constitution
gives Congress the power "to regulate commerce with foreign na-
tions, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes."" This clause has been interpreted to give the Congress
an affirmative power to adopt federal statutes with regard to com-
merce,49 to engage in state regulation of commerce,"0 and to limit
state regulation under its "dormant" or "negative" commerce
power." The Dormant Commerce Clause was first acknowledged
in the nineteenth century5 and explicated by Chief Justice Mar-
shall in his view that "the doctrine that the commerce clause, by
its own force and without national legislation, puts it into the
power of the Court to place limits upon state authority." 53 While
there was considerable debate about whether the power was im-
plied,54 the Court finally set a standard for federal judicial review
of state regulation of commerce in the absence of Congressional
legislation in Cooley v. Board of Wardens.5 5 Cooley denies states
the power to regulate aspects of interstate commerce if the regula-
tion was of such a local nature as to require different treatment
from one state to another.
IV. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AS RELATED TO STATE TAXATION
The Supreme Court considered a number of state tax chal-
lenges on the basis of the Commerce Clause in the nineteenth cen-
tury. The Court struck down a five-dollar fee charged by port
wardens for every vessel entering the port of New Orleans.5 An-
U .S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
" Alaska v. F/V Baranof, 677 P.2d 1245, 1249 (Alaska 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
823 (1984) (citing JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 267
(1978)).
00 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
"' See John B. Sholley, The Negative Implications of the Commerce Clause, 3 U.
Cm. L REv. 556 (1936).
"' See Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business: Perspectives on Two
Centuries of Constitutional Adjudication, 41 TAX LAW. 37 n.20 (1987) [hereinafter Inter-
state Business].
63 See FELIX FRANKFURTER. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL. TANEY AND
WAITE 17, 18 (photo. reprint 1964) (1937).
I Id. at 50.
" 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
Steamship Co. v. Portwardens, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 31 (1867).
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other tax on every person leaving the state by railroad was invali-
dated.57 The Court struck down a stamp tax on bills of lading for
interstate transportation of commodities. 8 These cases do not im-
ply that a state cannot tax interstate commerce at all. The Court
upheld a state tax on the gross receipts of railways. The Court
held that the gross receipts tax was more like a tax on personal or
real property and did not place an undue burden on interstate
commerce. 59 Traditionally, cases involving activities which the
courts considered local were in the exclusive control of the state,
and its taxes did not violate the Commerce Clause. Mining,
60
manufacturing" and agricultural production" are all considered
within state control.
In practice, however, it is difficult to discern how the courts
distinguish between local and non-local activities for interstate
commerce purposes. The Supreme Court's treatment of this area
has been criticized by authors in this area:
It is evident that the Court's efforts to distinguish between a tax
on railroad freight and one on receipts from carrying such
freight were not wholly successful. In this respect, these early
opinions were harbingers of the future. Indeed, taken together,
these two cases can be viewed as a paradigm of the Court's com-
merce clause jurisprudence in the state tax field for nearly a
century: two taxes that have a substantially similar impact on
interstate commerce are accorded different constitutional
treatment.6"
In 1977, the Court finally settled on a four-pronged test for
determining whether a state tax violates the Commerce Clause. In
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,6" the Court applied a four-
part test: the tax is permissible if the tax is "applied to an activity
with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, it is fairly appor-
" Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
" Almy v. California, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 169 (1860).
" State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts; Reading R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 82 U.S.
(15 Wall.) 284 (1872).
"0 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)(1976).
"' JEROLD VAN CISE. UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS 67-72 (1976).
11 FREDERICK M ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
(1962).
6 Interstate Business, supra note 52, at 44.
430 U.S. 274 (1977), rehg denied, 430 U.S. 976 (1977).
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tioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce and is
fairly related to the services provided by the State." 5
Specifically the idea of a severance tax on coal was upheld in
Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co.16 The Court held that the act of
severing natural resources was a local activity and did not concern
interstate commerce. Finally, in 1975 the Supreme Court upheld a
Montana severance tax on coal assessed at 30 % of the sale price,
concluding that mining did not involve interstate commerce, and
even if it did, Montana met the requisites of the four-part Com-
plete Auto Transit test."7 Commonwealth Edison v. Montana also
established that there is no nexus problem with severance taxes on
coal. 8 The second prong of the test is also a non-issue, as the
severance of the mineral can only occur in the taxing state by
definition. 9 The discrimination prong is one in which the sever-
ance tax might have faced problems. Plaintiffs, such as Common-
wealth Edison, claimed that most of the Montana coal was sold to
out-of-state consumers, which had the effect of shifting Montana's
tax burden out of state?0 The Court relied on cases such as Heis-
ler to allow states to export their tax burden to out-of-state con-
sumers if the exporting state did not charge the nonresidents a
higher tax rate than it charged residents.' The Court held that
the Commerce Clause did not imply any antitrust provision and
that terms such as monopoly do not apply in the absence of an
infringement on interstate commerce." Charging a higher rate to
nonresidents is a red flag of a Commerce Clause violation." The
fourth prong, that there be a fair relation between the tax and the
services provided by the state, is merely a test of whether the mea-
sure of the tax must be related to the taxpayer's contact with the
I' Id. at 279.
6 260 U.S. 245 (1922), overruled by Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, 453 U.S.
609 (1981) (rejecting Heisler's contention that a state severance tax is immunized from
Commerce Clause scrutiny).
"' Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
18 Id. at 617.
99 Id.
10 Id. at 617-18.
71 Id. at 618-19.
72 Id. at 619.
's See, e.g. Schurtz, supra note 22, at 80 n.162. "[Wihere simple economic protec-
tionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been er-
ected." Id.
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state.7 4 In Commonwealth Edison, the Supreme Court inexplica-
bly refused to engage in a discourse about the costs of providing
energy resources versus the benefits to the state. Instead, the
Court focused on whether the tax was reasonably related to the
taxpayer's contact with the state.7" As the dissenter in Common-
wealth Edison, Justice Blackmun argued that the Court should
interpret the test to balance the tax rate against its activities
within the state.7"
V. WYOMING V. OKLAHOMA
The Clean Air Act, a proliferation of severance taxes, and
the modern interpretation of the Commerce Clause, set the stage
for a dispute between Oklahoma and Wyoming regarding coal
burned in Oklahoma's power plants. In 1986, the State of
Oklahoma passed title 45, section 939 of the Oklahoma Statutes.
The text of the statute provides that all power plants generating
power in the state must use a minimum of 10% Oklahoma coal."
Oklahoma's legislature harbored a number of goals in passing the
act. In 1985, the legislature had adopted a resolution asking the
state's power plants to burn at least 10% of state-mined coal.
Oklahoma's lawmakers offered several reasons, one of which was
that burning Oklahoma coal would benefit the state by saving
freight charges from Wyoming. Oklahoma ratepayers were paying
$300 million annually for Wyoming coal. This expenditure re-
sulted in $9 million in severance tax revenues for Wyoming. As a
result, Oklahoma's legislature decided a preference for Oklahoma
coal would offer the dual benefit of keeping Oklahoma money in-
state and promoting economic development.78
" 453 U.S. at 626 (quoting Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250
(1938)).
11 453 U.S. at 629-30.
76 Id. at 646-48.
" The text of the statutes provides: "Coal-fired electric generating plants-burning
Oklahoma coal. All entities providing electric power for sale to the consumer in Oklahoma
and generating said power from coal-fired plants located in Oklahoma shall burn a mixture
of coal that contains a minimum or ten percent Oklahoma mined coal, as calculated on a
BTU basis." OKLA. STAT. tit. 45, § 939.1 (1992). Two amendments to the Act in 1988
provide that cost of complying with the act should not be passed on to consumers and that
Oklahoma's preference must not be for products of inferior quality. OKLA. STAT tit. 74,
§ 85.32 (1992).
78 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S.Ct. 789, 794 (1992).
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None of the four Oklahoma power plants complied with the
legislature's resolution. Therefore, Oklahoma subsequently passed
the statute requiring the power plants to use 10% Oklahoma coal.
Prior to passage of the law, 100% of Oklahoma's power plant coal
usage was derived from Wyoming. After passage of Oklahoma's
act, Wyoming lost $535,886 in severance taxes in 1987, $542,352
in 1988, and $87,130 in the first four months of 1989.
79
Wyoming brought suit against Oklahoma on the grounds that
the statute violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. Wyoming, a
major coal-producing state, did not sell coal as a state entity. The
State based its standing on the lost severance tax revenue. 80 Wyo-
ming collected severance taxes from eight mining companies
which sold coal to four Oklahoma utilities.81 Wyoming raised a
Dormant Commerce Clause challenge, arguing that Oklahoma's
act placed an undue burden on interstate commerce. Wyoming
sought the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Oklahoma
argued that Wyoming lacked standing to raise the Commerce
Clause issue and should not be allowed to invoke original
jurisdiction. 2
The Supreme Court held that Wyoming had standing to sue,
basing its decisions on two cases: Maryland v. Louisiana83 and
Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Commission.84 The Mary-
land case is used to support the notion that lost severance tax rev-
enue, traceable directly to Oklahoma's severance tax, provided
sufficient evidence to pass the test for standing. The Maryland v.
Louisiana precedent is binding, however, because a state may "act
as the representative of its citizens in original actions where the
injury affects the general population of a state in a substantial
way.''8 It is questionable whether this statute applies in a case
7" Id. at 795 (quoting from an affidavit of Richard J. Marble, Director, Minerals Tax
Division, Wyoming Department of Revenue and Taxation, attached as an exhibit of Ap-
pendix to Motion of Wyoming for Summary Judgment. Oklahoma did not dispute the
estimates provided by Wyoming).
'0 WYo. STAT. §§ 39-6-301 to -308 (1990 & Supp. 1991).
" 112 S.Ct. at 794.
I d. at 791.
8S 451 U.S. 725 (1981); see also Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900) (holding that
in order for a state to maintain an action against another state, direct interests of the states
must be involved); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1923); New Hamp-
shire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 91 (1883) (holding a state may not execute a claim against
another state on behalf of its citizens without the consent of the state being sued).
, 432 U.S. 333 (1971).
'B 451 U.S. at 737.
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such as Wyoming, which has an exhaustible resource, no proof
that other markets have been depleted, and a minimal decrease in
state revenues (less than 1 %) attributable to the Oklahoma
statute.8 6
In Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Commission,87 the
Court allowed a state agency to assert the claims of Washington
apple growers. North Carolina enacted a statute which, in effect,
prohibited the display of Washington State apple grades on closed
containers shipped into North Carolina.8" The Washington State
Apple Advertising Commission was a statutory agency designed to
protect and promote the Washington apple industry. Growers paid
mandatory assessments which supported the agency's activities.
The agency sued North Carolina, alleging that a law requiring
that apples sold or shipped into North Carolina in closed contain-
ers be identified by no grade on the container, other than the ap-
plicable federal grade, violated the Commerce Clause.
89
North Carolina challenged the commission's standing, con-
tending that because the apple association was a state agency
rather than a traditional trade association, it had no standing to
sue under the Commerce Clause.9" The Supreme Court applied
the three-pronged test from Warth v. Seldin9' to determine when
an association has standing to ' act in a representational capacity:
(1)its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own
right; (2)the members it seeks to protect are germane to the or-
ganization's purpose; and (3)neither the claim asserted nor the re-
lief requested requires the participation in the lawsuit of each of
the individual members. The Court thought the elements were
met because: (1)some Washington apple growers had removed
Washington State grades from North Carolina-bound containers,
which diminished the efficiency of their operation; (2)the associa-
tion's attempt to remedy injuries due to North Carolina's law are
part of the association's purpose; and (3)neither the association's
constitutional claim nor the relief requested requires individual-
ized proof.
11 Wyoming, 112 S.Ct. at 799-802.
67 432 U.S. 333.
" Id. at 335.
as Id. at 339.
90 Id. at 341.
% 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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In addition, the Court found that the association's status as a
state agency does not "preclude" it from asserting the claims of
the apple growers. Justice Scalia believed that the apple growers
association already had met the criteria for standing based on
their associational status. The Court merely resolved that if the
association had standing otherwise, its existence as a state agency
would not defeat standing. Scalia believed that it is a long jump to
move from that position to one which essentially says that by tax-
ing states have standing to sue under the Commerce Clause.92 The
Court also found it important that the association itself was di-
rectly affected, since it relied on funds from producers to fund its
office.
However, the Washington State Apple case does not apply to
the Wyoming v. Oklahoma situation. First, in Washington State
Apple, the association advanced its own "injury in fact" not just
that of the State's apple producers. As Justice Scalia noted in his
dissent in Wyoming, it is up to the plaintiff to establish his injury
through "specific, concrete facts" showing that the third party ac-
tually acted as he maintains and that the injury actually oc-
curred.93 Scalia refused to rely on Wyoming's assertion that it ob-
tained less severance tax revenue because of reduced sales to
Oklahoma, saying:
I am willing to assume for the sake of argument that undisputed
fact compels the inference that less Wyoming coal was sold in
Oklahoma as a result of the Act. To establish injury, however,
Wyoming had to show not merely that the statute caused
Oklahoma sales to be lost, but that it prevented Wyoming "sev-
erance" of coal from occurring. Wyoming does not tax sales of
coal to Oklahoma utilities, it taxes severances.94
Furthermore, Scalia noted that Wyoming attempted to prove
that it had suffered a drop in production capacity due to lost sales
to Oklahoma. Wyoming relied on the testimony of a coal market
analyst to support this proposition. Scalia believed that this testi-
mony was not sufficient to meet Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56(e) requirements because the expert failed to set forth facts and
merely expressed opinions.99 Scalia was troubled as to why Wyo-
" Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S.Ct. 789, 809 (1992).
" Id.at 806 (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 508).
94 Id.
95 Id. at 807.
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ming coal companies, themselves, were not the litigants rather
than the State. This point was not mere idle curiosity. Almost
every case of Dormant or Negative Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence begins with a statement of the purpose of the clause as en-
couraging free trade." The purpose of the clause is "to benefit
those who are . . . engaged in interstate commerce."' 1 Wyoming's
interest in collecting taxes, Scalia believed, was too far removed
from the national market or free trade to be protected by the
Commerce Clause. The State's interest in taxation has more com-
monly been an element balanced against the interest in interstate
commerce in earlier Commerce Clause cases and has never been
allowed to provide a basis for standing. 98
Scalia believed the Court's holding in Wyoming v. Oklahoma
could produce disastrous and ridiculous litigation:
Further expansions of standing (or irrational distinctions) lurk
just around the corner: if a State has a litigable interest in the
taxes that would have been paid upon an unconstitutionally ob-
structed sale, there is no reasonable basis for saying that a com-
pany salesman does not have a litigable interest in the commis-
sions that would have been paid, or a union in the wages that
would have been earned."9
Scalia predicted that the results of the Wyoming case would be a
precipitous increase in state-against-state Commerce Clause
suits.", o
CONCLUSION
Congress, in enacting the Clean Air Act, clearly was sensitive
to the problems of conflict between states regarding natural re-
sources. Energy sectionalism has been a concern of various legal
scholars since the Arab oil embargo. Professor Gary D. Allison
believes that energy issues tend to be divisive because the nation's
economic health depends on reliable, available and reasonably-
priced energy supplies and a reduction in the "fear of energy dis-
, See. e.g. American Trucking Ass'ns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987); West-
inghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax
Comm'n., 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
" Wyoming, 112 S.Ct. at 808 (quoting Dennis v. Higgins, II1 S.Ct. 865, 877-78
(1991)).
I ld. at 809.




ruptions among sources based in the Middle East, the increase in
cost of the world's conventional energy supplies and the significant
externalities and social costs associated with energy
production."' 0'
For two centuries, the Supreme Court and Congress have
struggled with the extent to which a state may favor its own citi-
zens with regard to disposition of resources.102 Historically, the
theoretical construct has been to balance the sovereignty of the
state against interstate equality. 103 Others have proposed that the
true question is to distinguish between permissible and impermis-
sible preferences, prohibiting a state from preferring its own citi-
zens in such a manner as to interfere with the market while at the
same time reserving to the state actions that offer advantages to
its citizens. 104
As Justice Scalia predicted, the Supreme Court's ruling in
Wyoming v. Oklahoma will exacerbate conflict between states, es-
pecially as natural resource demands increase. The Court's actions
are particularly insidious when they defy the intent of Congress.
While it is true that Congress has made no explicit law regarding
severance taxation of minerals, it clearly expressed an intention to
minimize conflict between states. The Wyoming case allows Wyo-
ming to have it both ways: Wyoming is allowed to act as a quasi-
market participant, enforcing rights on behalf of Wyoming's coal
producers, whom the Dormant Commerce Clause is intended to
protect and who were unwilling to sue themselves. Yet, the courts
have distinguished between sovereign and proprietary state func-
tions in cases such as National League of Cities v. Usery.'°5 This
market participant/sovereign dichotomy was discarded in Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.1 06 One commen-
tator believes that granting states immunity as market partici-
pants cannot be squared with the Garcia approach to the Coin-
101 Id. at 705.
02 Mark P. Gergen, The Selfish State and the Market, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1097 (May
1988).
103 See, e.g., id. at 1101.
104 Id. at 1106.
105 426 U.S. 883 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985), rehg denied, 471 U.S. 1049 (1985). In Nat'l League of Cities v.
Usery, the Court barred Congress from requiring states to comport with federal wage and
hour rules. The Court found that the state was engaged in a traditional function and was
protected by the Tenth Amendment.
1o 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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merce Clause: "Except when encountering invidious
discrimination, federal courts ought not to use the commerce
clause to balance and preempt state economic regulation. That is
a task for Congress."1 7 The dictates of congressional action, as
well as common sense, require that the Dormant Commerce
Clause standing requirements not be expanded in the manner en-
dorsed by the Court in Wyoming v. Oklahoma.
fo' Karl Manheim, New Age Federalism and the Market Participant Doctrine, 22
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 559, 563 (1990).
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